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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3285 
_____________ 
 
NICHOLAS DINIZO 
 
v. 
 
THE TOWNSHIP OF SCOTCH PLAINS;  
THOMAS E. ATKONS 
 
     The Township of Scotch Plains, 
                                      Appellant 
  _____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                       
District Court No. 2-07-cv-05327 
District Judge: The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 24, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  April 1, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 Nicholas Dinizo is an employee of the Township of Scotch Plains, New Jersey.  
He sued the Township and his supervisor for employment discrimination.  The complaint 
asserted four claims, including a claim for retaliation under New Jersey’s Law Against 
Discrimination (LAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–1 et seq.  The case proceeded to trial, 
where Dinizo prevailed on the retaliation claim but lost on the others.  The jury awarded 
him $1,500 in damages.  Pursuant to the LAD’s fee-shifting provision, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
10:5–27.1, the District Court awarded Dinizo’s counsel roughly $141,900 in attorney’s 
fees.  To arrive at this figure, the Court determined the lodestar amount for the entire 
case, i.e., the number of hours counsel reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable 
hourly rate.  See Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001).  It then reduced 
that figure by 55% to account for Dinizo’s limited success.   
 The Township challenges the fee award as excessive.  We review for an abuse of 
discretion.  Lanni, 259 F.3d at 148; Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1217 (N.J. 1995).  
Under the LAD, a prevailing plaintiff “may be awarded a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 10:5–27.1.  “Reasonable” does not mean “proportionate”: that Dinizo 
obtained a modest award of damages does not mean that the attorney’s fee award must be 
commensurately modest.  Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., Inc., 661 A.2d 1232, 1243 
(N.J. 1995); accord Washington v. Phila. Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 
1041–42 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that “a court may not diminish counsel fees in a section 
1983 action to maintain some ratio between the fees and the damages awarded”).  A 
reasonable fee, instead, is one “that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake 
the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.”  Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 
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130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988); accord New Jerseyans for 
Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 883 A.2d 329, 338 (N.J. 2005) 
(discussing the LAD’s fee-shifting provision).   
In determining a fee award, a court should begin with the lodestar amount, and 
then proceed to take into account other relevant factors, including the degree of overall 
success achieved.  Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1226–27; Szczepanski, 661 A.2d at 1239.  We 
have carefully reviewed the record, and, although the District Court’s fee award may be 
at the high end of what is permissible, we cannot say that the Court abused its discretion 
in awarding Dinizo’s counsel 45% of the lodestar amount.  Accordingly, we will affirm.    
